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COMMENT
THE NINTH CIRCUIT ERRS
AGAIN: THE QUIET TITLE ACT AS
A BAR TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
E. JOHN ATHENS, JR.*
This Comment examines recent Ninth Circuit decisions barring
judicial review of administrative decisions adjudicating Native
allotment claims and nullifying Alaska’s highway rights-of-way
where they conflict. The Ninth Circuit bases this bar to review on
the Indian lands exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity
found in the Quiet Title Act. This Comment illustrates where the
Ninth Circuit erred in its analysis, and concludes with recommendations for legislation to correct the jurisdictional vacuum created
by these Ninth Circuit decisions.

I. INTRODUCTION
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has received criticism for
1
its relatively high rate of questionable decisions. U.S. Senator
Murkowski has observed that the Ninth Circuit “has an appallingly
2
high reversal rate by the Supreme Court,” and there has even been

Copyright © 2002 by E. John Athens, Jr. This Comment is also available on the
Internet at http://www/law/duke/edu/journals/19ALRAthens.
* Supervising Attorney, Office of the Attorney General, State of Alaska, Fairbanks, Alaska; J.D., University of Notre Dame Law School, 1971; B.A., University
of Virginia, 1968. The author extends special thanks to his colleague, Assistant
Attorney General Paul R. Lyle, for his insights and research support.
1. Arthur D. Hellman, Getting it Right: Panel Error and the En Banc Process
in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 425, 426 (2000) (arguing that the current Ninth Circuit “generates a disproportionate number of
panel decisions that are wrong, and the existing en banc process fails to provide
the necessary corrective”).
2. Sen. Frank Murkowski, Ninth Circuit, Arctic to Mexico Too Big for True
Justice, ALASKA BAR RAG, May-June 2000, at 10.
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criticism within the Ninth Circuit itself.3 This Comment will focus
on how the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly erred regarding a sovereign immunity issue involving judicial review of certain administra4
tive decisions.
Recent decisions of the Ninth Circuit and the Alaska Supreme
5
Court highlight the issue. The cases involve a dispute between
Evelynn Foster, who is an Alaska Native, and the State of Alaska
over a parcel of land claimed for a Native allotment and crossed by
6
a state public highway. The federal court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because of sovereign immunity; while the
state court held that it lacked jurisdiction because it could not ad7
judicate matters involving Native allotment lands. The result of
these decisions is that no federal or state judicial forum exists to re8
solve the contested ownership of an important parcel of land.
There is little reason to question the Alaska Supreme Court’s
9
decision; a federal statute’s proscription against state court juris10
diction is explicit. However, there is ample reason to question the
Ninth Circuit’s decision that the Quiet Title Act deprives federal
11
courts of jurisdiction.
This Comment has several purposes. The first is to illustrate
the Ninth Circuit’s errors in Foster, and why the court should have
concluded there was in fact jurisdiction for the federal district court
to decide the merits of the case. The second purpose is to review a
complex area of Indian law that has not received scholarly discus3. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
5. See Alaska v. Babbitt (Foster), 75 F.3d 449 (9th Cir. 1995); Foster v. State,
34 P.3d 1288 (Alaska 2001).
6. Foster, 75 F.3d at 450-51; Foster, 34 P.3d at 1289.
7. Foster, 75 F.3d at 454; Foster, 34 P.3d at 1291.
8. Even if the assertion of sovereign immunity would leave a party with no
forum for its claim, the lack of a forum is not a basis to avoid dismissal of a suit.
Alaska v. Babbitt (Albert), 38 F.3d 1068, 1077 (9th Cir. 1994).
9. See Foster, 34 P.3d at 1290-91.
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (2000), which provides in relevant part:
Nothing in this section . . . shall confer jurisdiction upon the State to adjudicate, in probate proceedings or otherwise, the ownership or right to
possession of [property held in trust by the United States or subject to a
restriction against alienation imposed by the United States] or any interest therein.
11. See 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (2000). The Quiet Title Act waives the sovereign
immunity of the United States, subject to certain exceptions, in actions to adjudicate title disputes involving real property in which the United States claims an interest. Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 275-76 (1983). Immunity is not
waived where the land either is held in “trust or [is] restricted Indian lands.” Id. at
283.
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sion despite a number of Ninth Circuit decisions and a federal district court decision.12 The Comment concludes with suggestions for
legislation to fill the legal lacuna, thereby allowing the parties in
Foster and similar cases to resolve their claims.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Development of the Legal Conflict
Until 1987, Native allotments were subject to Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) highway right-of-way grants to the State of
Alaska, provided the grants were issued before an allotment appli13
cation was filed. In 1987, the Interior Board of Land Appeals
(IBLA) decided Golden Valley Electric Ass’n [GVEA] (On Recon14
sideration). In this decision the IBLA held, for the first time, that
an allotment claim would not be subject to a right-of-way grant issued by the BLM to a third party, so long as the Native’s use and
occupancy of the allotment commenced before the grant was issued. The court held that this rule applies even if the allotment
application were not filed with the BLM until after the right-of-way
15
grant was made. This holding was based on the “relation back”
doctrine, by which the preference right to a Native allotment relates back to the date use and occupancy commenced, even though
16
GVEA (On Reconsideration)
the application was filed later.
“marked a departure from the approach espoused by the [IBLA]”
in earlier decisions holding that allotments were subject to BLM
17
highway grants. Although GVEA (On Reconsideration) concerned a utility right-of-way that was not appropriated to the utility
by the authorizing statute, the decision has nevertheless been applied to defeat highway rights-of-way appropriated to Alaska under 23 U.S.C. § 317. That statute provides for appropriations of
18
federal land for highway purposes.
12. See Albert, 38 F.3d 1068; Foster, 75 F.3d 449; Alaska v. Babbitt (Bryant),
182 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 1999); Alaska v. Norton, 168 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (D. Alaska
2001).
13. State of Alaska (Johnson & Craig), 133 IBLA 281, 287 n.8 (1995).
14. 98 IBLA 203 (1987) [hereinafter GVEA (On Reconsideration)].
15. Id. at 205-08.
16. Id. at 205.
17. Johnson & Craig, 133 IBLA at 287 n.8.
18. See, e.g., State of Alaska (Foster), 125 IBLA 291 (1993); State of Alaska
(Sinyon & Mohamad), 124 IBLA 386 (1992). The distinction of the highway rightof-way being appropriated to Alaska by the federal government pursuant to statute is critical. See infra notes 33, 109, 124, 125 and accompanying text. No IBLA
decision has ever considered this distinction.
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Although GVEA (On Reconsideration) was premised on the
Native use and occupancy being open and notorious to defeat a
19
subsequently granted right-of-way to Alaska, even this check on
an allotment applicant’s power to defeat a highway right-of-way
was soon abandoned by the IBLA. In 1989, in State of Alaska
20
(GVEA), the IBLA held that the allotment applicant’s right to the
allotment (with respect to legislatively approved allotments) accrued at the time the allotment application stated that use and occupancy commenced, and there could be no inquiry into the suffi21
ciency of use and occupancy or whether it occurred at all.
The effect of GVEA (On Reconsideration) and State of Alaska
(GVEA) was to defeat many of the highway right-of-way grants
made by the BLM to Alaska where they conflicted with a Native
22
allotment claim. The nullification of Alaska’s grants was premised on the IBLA’s interpretations of law in 1987 and 1989, notwithstanding that almost all of the highway right-of-way grants had
been issued to Alaska in the 1960s, and the roads had long since
23
been built in reliance on the grants.
In 1995, the IBLA expressed concern with the fairness of in24
terpreting and applying the 1980 legislative approval statute to divest previously established rights in the land. The IBLA held that
a new law “could not retroactively change the status of the land to

19. Johnson & Craig, 133 IBLA at 287-88.
20. 110 IBLA 224 (1989).
21. Id. at 229. Subject to exceptions, allotments after 1980 that had not already been adjudicated were legislatively approved. 43 U.S.C. § 1634(a) (2000).
See generally DAVID S. CASE & DAVID A. VOLUCK, ALASKA NATIVES AND
AMERICAN LAWS (2d ed. 2002).
22. The IBLA in State of Alaska (GVEA) observed that Alaska had the opportunity to prevent legislative approval and require adjudication of the allotment
by objecting pursuant to 43 U.S.C. §§ 1634(a)(5)(B) and (C) within 180 days of
December 2, 1980. 110 IBLA at 228 (citing 43 U.S.C. §§ 1634(a)(5)(B) and (C)
(1982)). However, until 1987 Alaska had no way of knowing that it needed to
have made objections before 1982 to protect its highway rights-of-way appropriated under 43 U.S.C. § 317. Under 43 U.S.C. §1634(a)(1), legislatively approved
allotments were required to be made subject to valid existing rights. Further, until
the IBLA changed its interpretation in 1987, GVEA (On Reconsideration), 98
IBLA 203 (1987), all Native allotments were required to be subject to highway
rights-of-way. See supra note 17. As to other problems with State of Alaska
(GVEA), see Judge Burski’s opinion in Sinyon & Mohamad, 124 IBLA at 393-98
(Burski, J., concurring specially).
23. The two Golden Valley Electric Authority (GVEA) decisions are discussed in Alaska v. Babbitt (Albert), 38 F.3d 1068, 1071-72, 1075-76, 1076 n.7 (9th
Cir. 1994), where they are referred to as Alaska I and Alaska II.
24. 43 U.S.C. § 1634(a) (2000).
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the detriment of a third party.”25 In 1997, the IBLA went further
and noted that “[i]ndeed, these two [GVEA] decisions have been
the subject of criticism within the Board and, at least in some as26
pects, their continuing validity has been undermined.”
Had it not been for the initial GVEA decision in 1987, the
Foster allotment would have been made subject to Alaska’s highway right-of-way by the BLM as a matter of course, and there
would likely have been no ensuing litigation. Although the IBLA
is now retreating from its 1987 and 1989 GVEA decisions, the
BLM and the IBLA still use these cases as precedent to defeat
27
Alaskan interests.
B. Foster’s Dispute with Alaska, and the Administrative
Proceedings
The underlying dispute in the Foster litigation concerns her
claim for a Native allotment that overlaps with part of the Parks
28
Highway right-of-way owned by the State of Alaska. Each party
29
asserts that its rights are superior.
Constructed between 1969 and 1971,30 the Parks Highway is
the main highway that connects Alaska’s two largest cities, Anchorage and Fairbanks, and provides access to Denali National
Park. The right-of-way for the Parks Highway was granted by the
31
BLM to Alaska in 1969. A material site to be used for the construction and maintenance of the Parks Highway was granted by
25. State of Alaska (Johnson & Craig), 133 IBLA 281, 289 n.10 (1995).
26. State of Alaska (Goodlataw), 140 IBLA 205, 213 n.6 (1997).
27. State of Alaska (Sabon), 154 IBLA 57, 61 (2000) (order denying reconsideration). Although the two GVEA cases are not cited as controlling precedent,
the order in Sabon is based on State of Alaska (Foster), 125 IBLA 291, 293-94
(1993), which relies on the two GVEA cases.
28. Alaska v. Babbitt (Foster), 75 F.3d 449, 450-51 (9th Cir. 1995).
29. Alaska’s principal arguments on the merits revolve around: (1) the plenary
power of the federal government to make grants of public land to Alaska notwithstanding Indian occupancy of such land; (2) the nature of the public land grants
made to Alaska as “appropriations” under 23 U.S.C. § 317, which rendered the
land unavailable for allotment under the Alaska Native Allotment Act; and (3)
the intention of the federal government as expressed in the highway grants themselves that the grants were paramount to other claims based on occupancy, settlement, or entry of the land. See infra notes 33, 109, 124, & 125 and accompanying
text.
Foster has not identified or advanced specific arguments in her own name.
Rather, her interests at the administrative level have been protected by the Office
of the Regional Solicitor, U.S. Department of the Interior. Foster, 125 IBLA 291.
30. Foster, 125 IBLA at 292.
31. Id.
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the BLM to Alaska in 1961.32 Both the 1969 highway grant and the
1961 material site grant were made by the BLM pursuant to 23
33
U.S.C. § 317.
By express terms within the 1969 and 1961 BLM grants, as in
most BLM grants to Alaska issued pursuant to 23 U.S.C. § 317, the
BLM provided that the rights granted to Alaska would be paramount to any other claims to the land based on settlement, entry,
34
Under § 317, the federal government granted
or occupancy.
states rights-of-way over federal lands both for highways and for
35
material sites. The BLM has regulatory authority over the rights36
of-way. The BLM also has regulatory authority over applications
37
for Native allotments.

32. Foster v. State, 34 P.3d 1288, 1289 (Alaska 2001). A material site is generally an open pit where organic overburden has been stripped from the surface, and
rock and gravel deposits are mined for road building materials. S. Idaho Conf.
Ass’n of Seventh Day Adventists v. United States, 418 F.2d 411, 413 & n.2, 415
n.10 (9th Cir. 1969).
33. Each of the grants specifies that it is made pursuant to the Act of August
27, 1958, 23 U.S.C. § 317 (2000). 23 U.S.C. § 317 expressly provides that grants to
the states are appropriations of public lands. An allotment may not be approved
on appropriated land. Id.; see also infra note 124 and accompanying text.
34. Such grant terms are consistent with the plenary power of the United
States over public land, including Indian occupied land. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v.
United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955); United States v. Clarke, 529 F.2d 984, 986
(9th Cir. 1976); Alaska v. 13.90 Acres of Land, 625 F. Supp. 1315, 1320 & n.7 (D.
Alaska 1985), aff’d sub nom. Etalook v. Exxon Pipeline Co., 831 F.2d 1440 (9th
Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 F. Supp. 1009, 1020
n.45 (D. Alaska 1977), aff’d 612 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 1980). To date no IBLA decision has addressed the legal effect of such grant provisions in the BLM grants to
Alaska, although the issue has been raised. See e.g., State of Alaska (Sabon), 154
IBLA 57, 59 (2000). The refusal of the IBLA to address this argument is yet another reason why there should be judicial review of IBLA decisions.
35. Alaska v. Norton, 168 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1104-05 (D. Alaska 2001) (explaining the application of the statute).
36. Seventh Day Adventists, 418 F.2d at 414. Even if the underlying land is
conveyed out of federal ownership, the BLM retains exclusive administrative
authority over the rights-of-way. Id. at 415-16; Norton, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 1108 &
n.14; see also State of Alaska Dept. of Highways, 20 IBLA 261, 268 (1975) (recognizing the “inferred authority” of the Secretary of the Interior to manage material
site rights-of-way where “no such authority is expressly created by [23 U.S.C. §
317]”).
A right-of-way remains valid and effective “until it is specifically canceled” by
the BLM. Seventh Day Adventists, 418 F.2d at 414-15. See also 43 C.F.R. § 244.16
(1955) (“No right-of-way shall be deemed to be canceled except on the issuance of
a specific order of cancellation.”).
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Foster applied for a Native allotment of land in 1971 with the
Department of the Interior, in accordance with the Alaska Native
38
Allotment Act of 1906. Foster claimed to have commenced her
39
use and occupancy of the land in 1964.
Foster prevailed at the agency level in the conflict between her
40
interests and Alaska’s interests. Initially, the BLM ruled that Foster’s allotment claim nullified the state’s highway right-of-way
where the two conflicted, and approved Foster’s allotment application. The BLM also ruled that the allotment was subject to the material site that it had granted to Alaska in 1961. Not only does this
material site cover a large part of the allotment claim, but the Parks
Highway is constructed entirely within the material site where it
crosses the allotment. The IBLA affirmed the BLM decision,
holding that the 1969 Parks Highway right-of-way was invalid
where it crossed the land claimed by Foster because of her occu-

Most of the rights-of-way appropriated by the BLM to Alaska pursuant to 23
U.S.C. § 317 were issued subject to the BLM regulations in Circular 1915. 43
C.F.R. Part 244 (1955). Later amendments to these regulations were made in the
1960s. Under 43 C.F.R. § 2801.4 (2001), the current BLM right-of-way regulations
apply to all grants from the BLM unless the grant was issued before 1976 and the
administration of the current regulations “diminishes or reduces any rights conferred by the grant . . . , in which event the provisions of the [pre-1976] grant . . .
shall apply.” Id.; see also Myers v. United States, 378 F.2d 696, 702 (Ct. Cl. 1967)
(stating that with respect to Alaska’s right-of-way grants, “the law in force at the
time the grant is made governs”).
37. The BLM has the regulatory authority to process applications for Native
allotments pursuant to 43 C.F.R. subpt. 2561 (2001). See CASE & VOLUCK, supra
note 21, at 125-27; see also Pence v. Andrus, 586 F.2d 733, 734-35 (9th Cir. 1978)
(noting that the Department of the Interior regulations governing the grant of allotments met “at least the minimum due process requirements”).
The IBLA is the component of the Department of the Interior that has review functions over BLM decisions. Harrison v. Hickel, 6 F.3d 1347, 1353 n.3 (9th
Cir. 1993). The rules applicable to IBLA proceedings are found in 43 C.F.R. §§
4.400-.415 (2001).
38. 43 U.S.C. §§ 270-1 to 270-3 (Supp. V 1965-1969) (repealed 1971). This Act
was repealed in 1971 with a savings clause for allotment applications pending before the Department of the Interior on December 18, 1971. Id. § 1617(a) (2000);
see also Foster, 75 F.3d at 450-51 & n.1. Under the Allotment Act, the Secretary
of the Interior was authorized “under such rules as he may prescribe, to allot not
to exceed one hundred and sixty acres of vacant, unappropriated, and unreserved
nonmineral land” in Alaska to Indian or Eskimo Natives of Alaska. 43 U.S.C. §
270-1. See generally CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 21 (discussing of the history of
the Allotment Act and its substantive provisions).
39. Foster, 75 F.3d at 451.
40. See State of Alaska (Foster), 125 IBLA 291, 291 (1993).
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pancy since 1964.41 The decision did not affect the 1961 material
42
site. After the IBLA decision, an Allotment Certificate was issued
43
to Foster, subject to the 1961 material site, but not subject to the
44
Parks Highway right-of-way.
C. The Course of Judicial Proceedings
Alaska requested judicial review of the Foster IBLA decision
45
in federal district court under the Administrative Procedure Act
and a provision in the Alaska National Interest Lands Conserva46
tion Act (ANILCA). Alaska complained that it was error for the
agency to void the Parks Highway right-of-way grant where it
47
crossed Foster’s allotment claim. The district court accepted the
federal government’s argument that Alaska’s action was covered
48
49
by the Quiet Title Act (QTA), and dismissed it. Although the
41. The IBLA determined that GVEA (On Reconsideration), 98 IBLA 203
(1987), was controlling precedent, requiring that the allotment claim prevail over
the Parks Highway right-of-way where the two conflict. Foster, 125 IBLA at 29395.
42. Foster, 125 IBLA at 293-95. The IBLA decision is silent on the 1961 material site because neither Foster nor Alaska appealed this part of the BLM’s decision. Therefore, although the 1961 material site is not mentioned by the IBLA in
its decision, Foster’s allotment remains subject to this material site, as provided by
her Allotment Certificate.
43. Foster v. State, 34 P.3d 1288, 1289-90 (Alaska 2001). This decision refers
to a 1962 Parks Highway right-of-way and a 1969 amended Parks Highway rightof-way. The issue in the Foster litigation has always concerned the 1969 amended
highway grant, which is the right-of-way on which the Parks Highway was actually
constructed. See also Foster, 125 IBLA at 292 (explaining the situation).
44. Foster, 34 P.3d at 1290.
45. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000).
46. Alaska v. Babbitt (Foster) No. F93-038 CV, slip op. at 1 (D. Alaska June
16, 1994). The specific ANILCA provision is codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1632(a)
(2000); see infra note 114 and accompanying text.
47. Foster, No. F93-038 CV, slip op. at 6.
48. Id. at 2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (2000).
49. Foster, No. F93-038 CV, slip op. at 6; see Alaska v. Babbitt (Albert), 38
F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he United States remains in the position of
trustee of . . . property [subject to an allotment application] pending completion of
the allotment process.”). The BLM issues “trust certificates” for approved allotments. 43 U.S.C. § 1634(a)(1) (2000). The lands allotted are “inalienable and
non-taxable” and under “the protection of the United States,” unless such restrictions are removed in accordance with BLM approval. 43 C.F.R. § 2561.3 (2001).
Although the distinction is not treated as having practical significance, there
is confusion in the law as to whether the allotments are issued in trust, or are issued merely subject to restrictions. See CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 21, at 123-25.
Foster’s Allotment Certificate, issued in 1998, includes the restrictions required by
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QTA waives sovereign immunity in actions involving title to real
property, the QTA expressly excepts “trust or restricted Indian
50
lands.” The district court concluded that a Native allotment con51
52
stitutes such Indian land. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Because her allotment remains subject to the 1961 material
site, Foster’s victory before the IBLA and the Ninth Circuit has
been of little benefit to her. The Parks Highway is still on the land
she claims, and she is powerless to do anything about it since the
highway is also on the material site. Foster has no standing to
53
complain about Alaska’s use of its material site; only the BLM has
standing to complain about Alaska’s use of the material site for a
54
highway, which it has not done.
The practical effect of the Ninth Circuit decision is that it
maintains the status quo: Alaska possesses and controls the Parks
Highway where it crosses Foster’s allotment claim, and Foster cannot oust Alaska. The title question is left unresolved, since a dismissal on the basis of sovereign immunity is not a decision on the
55
merits.
The federal government’s strategy of raising the defense of
sovereign immunity is questionable given Alaska’s possession and
control of the disputed highway right-of-way. The federal govern56
ment owes a trust obligation to protect Foster’s Native allotment.

regulation, but states nothing about the allotment being issued “in trust,” notwithstanding 43 U.S.C. § 1634(a)(1).
50. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a) (2000).
51. Foster, No. F93-038 CV, slip op. at 5; Alaska v. Babbitt (Foster), 75 F.3d
449, 452 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Foster v. State, 34 P.3d 1288, 1290 n.17 (Alaska
2001).
52. Foster, 75 F.3d at 454.
53. Alaska v. Norton, 168 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1108 n.14 (D. Alaska 2001) (citing
S. Idaho Conf. of Seventh Day Adventists v. United States, 418 F.2d 411, 415-16
(9th Cir. 1969)).
54. Since the BLM granted Alaska the 1961 material site for the purpose of
constructing and maintaining the Parks Highway, it follows that using it for the
highway is consistent with the grant. Furthermore, the BLM may be reluctant to
take action against the grant because it issued the grant and may have potential
liability to Alaska. See United States v. Wilson, 707 F.2d 304, 311-12 (8th Cir.
1982); see also infra note 71. The BLM never complained about the Parks Highway being within the material site.
55. See 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 12.30
(3d ed. 1997) (“Dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not a judgment
on the merits, and it therefore has no claim preclusive or res judicata effect.”)
(citing Thompson v. County of Franklin, 15 F.3d 245, 253 (2d Cir. 1994)).
56. See Aguilar v. United States, 474 F. Supp. 840, 846 (D. Alaska 1979)
(stating that the U.S. government has trust obligations to Native Americans).
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However, its assertion of sovereign immunity prevents resolution
of the conflict.57 The highway remains on the property Foster
claims, she has no control over it, and her title remains clouded.
After the Ninth Circuit decision, Foster sued Alaska in state
58
court for ejectment and trespass under state law. The federal
government was not a party and did not participate in the suit. Because Foster’s action concerned a dispute over title to federal trust
property held for an Alaska Native, the Alaska Supreme Court
held that Alaska state courts have no jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1360(b), which proscribes state court adjudication of disputes involving property held in trust by the federal government for Indi59
ans.
Foster and the federal government may have chosen not to
bring an ejectment and trespass action in federal court because
such action would waive sovereign immunity and open the door to
an unfavorable ruling on the merits. If sovereign immunity were
waived, Alaska would proceed with its action for judicial review of
the Foster IBLA decision. The federal government is aware of
Alaska’s arguments on the merits from prior litigation, which resulted in two recent federal decisions suggesting that Alaska’s
highway right-of-way would be paramount to Foster’s allotment
60
claim.
As a result of the federal and state court decisions, neither
party can have its claim adjudicated to have the title question re61
solved, and a stalemate now exists.
III. WHERE THE NINTH CIRCUIT WENT WRONG
The Ninth Circuit’s strained interpretation of the QTA, beginning with Alaska v. Babbitt (Albert), and reaffirmed in Alaska v.

57. See Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 291-92 (1983) (Where sovereign
immunity prevents the merits of a title dispute from being resolved, “[n]othing
prevents the claimant from continuing to assert his title, in hope of inducing the
United States to file its own quiet title suit, in which the matter would finally be
put to rest on the merits.”).
58. Foster v. State, 34 P.3d 1288, 1290 & n.12 (Alaska 2001).
59. Id. at 1290-91.
60. Alaska v. Babbitt (Bryant), 182 F.3d 672, 676-77 (9th Cir. 1999); Alaska v.
Norton, 168 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1106-09 (D. Alaska 2001). Norton is the reported
decision on the Bryant remand.
61. Due to the Eleventh Amendment bar, Foster cannot herself maintain a
suit against Alaska in federal court. See Harrison v. Hickel, 6 F.3d 1347, 1353-54
(9th Cir. 1993). However, Foster does have the litigation option of suing the federal government for failing to fulfill its trust responsibility to protect her allotment. See id. at 1353-54.
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Babbitt (Foster) and other decisions,62 creates a jurisdictional vacuum. IBLA decisions that concern the creation of Indian trust land
and divest Alaska’s long held rights in that land granted by the federal government should and must be subject to judicial review.
In its decisions interpreting the QTA and holding that judicial
review is not available to Alaska, the Ninth Circuit apparently
63
overlooked its decision in Pence v. Kleppe, which held that “there
is no evidence of legislative intent to cut off judicial review,”
64
rather, “the opposite should be inferred.” Pence considered the
same allotment act as in Albert and Foster, and concerned judicial
65
review of administrative decisions made under the Act.
Had the Ninth Circuit considered Pence in Albert, it may have
reconsidered its conclusion that, in allotment cases, “the waiver of
66
sovereign immunity must be found, if at all within the QTA.”
Given that the Pence court held that the Allotment Act permits ju67
dicial review of secretarial decisions, it is difficult to argue that the
QTA precludes review, especially since the QTA is silent concerning judicial review of secretarial decisions under the Allotment
Act.
The court in Albert may have attempted to distinguish Pence
on the basis that Pence predicated judicial review of allotment decisions on 25 U.S.C. § 345, which waives sovereign immunity where
Indians sue for issuance of allotments. The QTA Indian lands exception was not an issue in Pence because the Secretary had determined that the land in question was not Indian land. However, an
attempt by the Albert court to distinguish Pence on the basis of §
345 would create an equal protection problem: allowing judicial review of allotment decisions for Natives whose Fifth Amendment
68
rights are violated by those decisions, while denying judicial review to similarly situated non-Natives is disparate treatment.
69
Morton v. Mancari held that statutes favoring Indians are based
on the “political status” of Indians, and are therefore subject only

62. See generally Bryant, 182 F.3d 672; Alaska v. Babbitt (Foster), 75 F.3d 449
(9th Cir. 1995); Alaska v. Babbitt (Foster), 67 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 1995); Alaska v.
Babbitt (Simmonds), 41 F.3d 1513 (9th Cir. 1994); Alaska v. Babbitt (Albert), 38
F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 1994).
63. 529 F.2d 135 (9th Cir. 1976).
64. Id. at 140.
65. Id. at 137.
66. Albert, 38 F.3d at 1073.
67. Pence, 529 F.2d at 138-39.
68. Id. at 140-41.
69. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
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to “rational basis” review under the Equal Protection Clause.70
Nevertheless, it would be difficult to demonstrate a rational basis
for granting judicial review to vindicate the Fifth Amendment
rights of Natives seeking allotments while denying review to nonNatives whose Fifth Amendment property interests are voided by
71
allotment decisions. The difference between the political status of
claimants is not sufficient to justify permitting judicial review to
Natives, but denying it to non-Natives in similar situations. This
constitutionally unjustified disparity of treatment could have been
avoided if the Ninth Circuit had concluded that the QTA’s Indian
lands exception to the waiver of immunity did not apply to judicial
72
review of administrative decisions.
A. The Relevance of the Quiet Title Act
The Ninth Circuit determined that the Indian trust land exception to the QTA did not waive immunity for actions for judicial re73
view of IBLA decisions involving Native allotments. Although
Alaska sought review under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) and 43 U.S.C. § 1632(a), the Ninth Circuit found that the
Indian trust land exception of the QTA “forbids the relief which is
74
sought.” Citing to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Block v.
70. Id. at 554-55. While the State of Alaska may not be entitled to equal protection of the laws, conflicting claims to the same land frequently arise between
non-Native individuals and entities and Native allotment applicants. See, e.g.,
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 127 IBLA 156 (1993); Kootznoowoo, Inc. v. Johnson,
109 IBLA 128 (1989); United States v. Flynn, 53 IBLA 208 (1981); Evelyn Alexander, 45 IBLA 28 (1980). The Albert and Foster decisions would no doubt be
cited as precedent to deny judicial review to non-Native persons seeking review of
allotment decisions that void their competing claims to the same land.
71. Although Alaska may not enjoy equal protection of the laws, it would be
entitled to just compensation under the Fifth Amendment for the inverse taking
of its interest in the Parks Highway. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S.
24, 31 (1984); Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 291 (1983); Armijo v. United
States, 663 F.2d 90, 93-94 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
72. See City of Sault Ste. Marie v. Andrus, 458 F. Supp. 465, 472 (D.D.C. 1978)
(rejecting argument that Indian lands exception of QTA requires dismissal of
suit); see infra note 85 and accompanying text.
73. Alaska v. Babbitt (Foster), 75 F.3d 449, 451-52 (9th Cir. 1995); Alaska v.
Babbitt (Albert), 38 F.3d 1068, 1072-76 (9th Cir. 1994). However, where Indian
trust or restricted lands are not involved, federal courts do have jurisdiction to review IBLA decisions pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §
702 (2000). Albert, 38 F.3d at 1072; Harrison v. Hickel, 6 F.3d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir.
1993).
74. Albert, 38 F.3d at 1072 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000)). Section 702 of the
APA is a general grant of federal jurisdiction for judicial review of final agency
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North Dakota,75 the Ninth Circuit held that the QTA is the “exclusive means by which adverse claimants [can] challenge the United
76
States’ title to real property,” and that one could not “avoid the
77
limitations of the QTA by bringing an action under the APA.”
The Ninth Circuit relied upon Block in Foster and other cases
where Alaska sought judicial review of an IBLA decision that approved a Native allotment and simultaneously nullified a right-of78
way conflicting with the allotment.
The Ninth Circuit incorrectly assumes that an action for judicial review of an agency decision initially creating Indian trust land
should be treated the same under the QTA as a civil action involving title to property that already is Indian land as a result of a
79
treaty or legislation creating a reservation. There is nothing in the
QTA to suggest Congress intended to bar judicial review of an administrative decision that initially creates Indian land. The Ninth
Circuit did not recognize this distinction, and did not consider
80
precedent that suggested the QTA is inapplicable.
Referring to the QTA’s legislative history, Albert recognizes
that the purpose of the Indian land exception in the QTA was to
protect “specific commitments to the Indian people through writ81
ten treaties and through informal and formal agreements.” The
legislative history demonstrates that the Indian land exception of
the QTA is unrelated to judicial review of agency adjudications of
82
claims by Indians that result in the creation of Indian land. There
is no treaty or agreement involved in the application for an allotdecisions. However, the statute also provides that “[n]othing herein . . . confers
authority to grant relief if any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly or
impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.” Id. The court in Albert relied on this
latter provision to circumvent the APA’s otherwise unequivocal grant of jurisdiction, holding that the QTA was an “other statute” that forbade judicial review. Id.
at 1072-73.
75. 461 U.S. 273 (1983).
76. Albert, 38 F.3d at 1073 (quoting Block, 461 U.S. at 286 n.22).
77. Id.
78. Foster, 75 F.3d at 452-53.
79. See Albert, 38 F.3d at 1072-73, 1072 n.4. The court makes no mention of
this distinction in the court’s discussion.
80. See, e.g., City of Sault Ste. Marie v. Andrus, 458 F. Supp. 465, 472 (D.D.C.
1978).
81. Albert, 38 F.3d at 1072 n.4 (citations omitted).
82. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-1559, at 22 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4547, 4556-57; see also Akootchook v. United States, 747 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir.
1984) (characterizing the interest under the Allotment Act as “the right to apply
for allotments,” and that Native Americans “have no general right to obtain an
ownership interest in the land” they use and occupy).
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ment. The QTA was not meant to protect agency decisions creating new claims by Indians or converting public lands into Indian
83
trust lands. The Ninth Circuit failed to recognize this critical dis84
tinction, and in doing so misinterpreted the QTA.
In other jurisdictions discussed below, courts have held that
the Indian lands exception of the QTA does not bar judicial review
of agency decisions that initially give rise to the claim that the
property is Indian land. For example, one court found that the argument for immunity based on the QTA must fail “[i]n the interests of ‘fairness and accountability in the administrative machinery
85
of the Government.’” Another court stated: “[w]e doubt whether
the Quiet Title Act precludes APA review of agency action by
86
which the United States acquires title.” The Ninth Circuit never
addressed this authority.
B. Giving Preclusive Effect to the IBLA Decision
Either the land in Albert and Foster is Indian trust land because of the agency decision, or it is not Indian trust land under the
QTA. If it is Indian trust land because of the agency decision, then
under Ninth Circuit precedent the agency decision may not be used
87
to preclude judicial review of that decision.
83. Although the purpose of the Indian lands exception of the QTA is to protect Indian lands, the exception nevertheless does not prevent a state from condemning Native allotment land under a state’s eminent domain powers. 25 U.S.C.
§ 357 (2000); see also Etalook v. Exxon Pipeline Co., 831 F.2d 1440, 1443-44 (9th
Cir. 1987). It makes little sense for the Ninth Circuit to bar judicial review of Native allotment adjudications on the basis of non-waiver of sovereign immunity under the QTA, where the state can proceed in federal court to condemn that land.
84. Albert, 38 F.3d at 1072-73, 1072 n.4.
85. Andrus, 458 F. Supp. at 472 (D.D.C. 1978) (quoting legislative history of
the 1976 APA amendments, found at H.R. REP. NO. 94-1654, at 9 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6130).
86. South Dakota v. United States Dep’t of Interior, 69 F.3d 878, 881 n.1 (8th
Cir. 1995), vacated by 519 U.S. 919 (1996). In addition to vacating the Eighth Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court ordered the court of appeals to remand the issue “to the Secretary of the Interior for reconsideration of [the] administrative decision” in light of new regulations being promulgated. South Dakota, 519 U.S. at
919; see also Connecticut v. Babbitt, 899 F. Supp. 80, 83 n.8 (D. Conn. 1995) (stating that there must be judicial recourse against arbitrary initial trust land decisions
by a federal agency).
87. Wehrli v. County of Orange, 175 F.3d 692, 694-95 (9th Cir. 1999). Wehrli
follows United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 421-23
(1966) (discussing when administrative decisions have been given preclusive effect). See also Convalescent Ctr. of Bloomfield, Inc. v. Dep’t of Income Maintenance, 544 A.2d 604, 608-10 (Conn. 1988) (collecting available authority on this

ATHENS INTERNET.DOC

2002]

QTA INDIAN LANDS EXCEPTION

03/26/03 3:30 PM

447

The Ninth Circuit did not articulate that it gave preclusive effect to the agency decisions in Albert and Foster, but its reliance on
88
the IBLA decisions is evident. In Albert, the Ninth Circuit stated
that it is the filing of an allotment application that makes the land
89
90
Indian trust land, a holding relied on by the Foster court. The
91
holding in Albert, however, is not supportable; the agency decision is the only way there could be a determination that the land is
Indian trust land.
Albert’s holding that the land becomes trust land upon the filing of an allotment application is based on Alaska v. 13.90 Acres of
92
Land. 13.90 Acres of Land held that the United States holds the
land in trust for the allottee once the allotment has vested, which
issue and concluding “that, without the availability of judicial review, neither the
decision of an administrative agency nor that of a court is ordinarily entitled to be
accorded preclusive effect in further litigation”).
88. In Albert, the court concluded that the underlying IBLA decision was
based upon a “reasoned interpretation” of judicial precedent. Albert, 38 F.3d at
1076. In Foster, the court was more equivocal about its reliance on the underlying
administrative decision, but stated that the court was “bound” to follow Albert.
Alaska v. Babbitt (Foster) 75 F.3d 449, 452, 454 (9th Cir. 1995). Conversely, in
Bryant, the court determined that the land was not Indian trust land because the
IBLA had reversed the administrative interpretation on which it had based its initial decision approving the Bryant allotment. Alaska v. Babbitt (Bryant), 182 F.3d
672, 677 (9th Cir. 1999).
89. Albert, 38 F.3d at 1073.
90. Foster, 75 F.3d at 452 (“Here, as in Albert, because the allotment remains
unpatented, the government has a trust interest in the disputed property . . . .”).
The court in Foster may have realized there were significant problems with dating
the trust interest from the time of the allotment application. However, rather than
confront the issue head-on, the court instead opted to dodge it by merely stating
that there is a trust interest as long as the allotment remains unpatented. Since a
patent (Allotment Certificate) is not issued until after the agency decision approving the allotment, the Foster court conveniently conforms with Albert, but
avoids facing the reality that Albert is simply wrong. Only the federal government
can create Indian trust land; there must be affirmative action on the part of the
government. By following Albert, the court in Foster improperly cedes that governmental prerogative to individual Natives.
91. Neither Albert, Foster, nor Alaska v. 13.90 Acres of Land, 625 F. Supp.
1315 (D. Alaska 1985), mentions the relevant regulatory provisions, which provide
that the filing of an application does nothing more than segregate the land and
protect it from future conflicting applications. 43 C.F.R. § 2561.1(e)(f) (2002).
Under the regulations, the filing of an application does not make the land Indian
trust land, although it does have a similar effect insofar as it protects the applicant’s use and occupancy of the land. Id.
92. Albert, 38 F.3d at 1073 (citing 13.90 Acres of Land, 625 F. Supp. at 1319-20,
1320 n.7).
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occurs when the application is filed.93 In that case, it appears that
the allotment was approved without objection, and there was no
94
legal impediment to the issuance of the allotment certificate. The
issue was whether legislation enacted subsequent to the filing of the
95
allotment application could affect the allottee’s title. The court
96
correctly held it could not. The court did not consider the question of whether an appropriation by the United States before the
application is filed would be a legal impediment to the allotment,
thereby preventing the allottee from gaining title. In fact, the allot97
tee cannot gain title to appropriated land. A prior appropriation
by the federal government means that the land does not and cannot
become Indian trust land merely by the filing of an allotment appli98
cation. The ruling in 13.90 Acres of Land that land becomes Indian trust land upon the filing of an application is, therefore, incorrect. The court in Albert failed to recognize that the 13.90 Acres of
Land holding does not apply where the land is appropriated by the
federal government before the filing of an allotment application.
It makes little sense that the mere filing of an application can
change the status of public domain land to Indian trust land where
the Allotment Act provides many conditions for the approval of a
Native allotment and vests the Secretary with discretion to approve
99
an allotment. There is nothing for the federal government to hold
in trust until equitable title passes to the applicant, which does not
100
happen until all conditions for an allotment have been satisfied,
93. 13.90 Acres of Land, 625 F. Supp. at 1319.
94. Id. at 1317.
95. Id. at 1320.
96. Id.
97. See supra note 33, infra notes 109, 124, 125 and accompanying text.
98. Id.
99. Under 42 U.S.C. § 270-1 (Supp. V 1965-1969) (repealed 1971), an allotment was limited to “one hundred and sixty acres of vacant, unappropriated, and
unreserved nonmineral land,” and the applicant must have been “the head of a
family, or [have been] twenty-one years of age.” See Pence v. Kleppe, 529 F.2d
135, 140 (9th Cir. 1976) (noting that the 1906 Alaska Native Allotment Act “defines the types of land available for allotment and . . . sets the requirements that an
applicant must meet in order to qualify”). Furthermore, the BLM regulations, 43
C.F.R. subpt. 2561 (2001), set forth detailed regulatory requirements.
100. Degnan v. Hodel, 16 Ind. L. Rptr. 3037, 3038 (D. Alaska Feb. 15, 1989);
see also Anne Lynn Purdy (On Reconsideration), 128 IBLA 161 (1994). Normally, equitable title will pass when the BLM issues a decision approving an allotment application. However, where the required use and occupancy preceded
the filing of an application, equitable title will be deemed to have passed upon
both the filing of the application and acceptable proof of qualifying use and occupancy. Id. at 164.
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including Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) certification.101 Thus, it
does not follow that the status of a parcel of land suddenly changes
to Indian trust land upon the filing of the application with the
BLM. Satisfaction of the conditions for an allotment is confirmed
and equitable title passes when the agency approves the allot102
ment. Without the approval, there would be nothing rational on
which a federal court could base its Indian trust land determination. Undoubtedly, if the final agency decision were denial of the
allotment application, the land would not be considered Indian
trust land simply due to the filing of an application.
The Ninth Circuit’s more recent decision in Alaska v. Babbitt
103
104
(Bryant) highlights the court’s error in Albert and Foster. To
decide that the QTA Indian lands exception did not apply, the
Bryant court had to ignore Albert’s holding that a Native allotment
105
becomes Indian trust land when the allotment application is filed.
Obviously Albert’s holding would not work in Bryant, where the
court held that the land was not Indian trust land under the QTA
106
in spite of Bryant’s allotment application. However, rather than
openly confronting this inconsistency, the court instead simply
chose to treat Bryant as harmonious with Albert (perhaps hoping
107
The inconsistency
that no one would notice the contradiction).
between Albert and Bryant underscores the Ninth Circuit’s faulty
determination that the QTA applies because the land is Indian
trust land. If the determination in Albert and Foster that the land is
Indian trust land comes from the court’s use of the agency decision
approving the allotment, which it must, then the preclusion principles of the court are violated. The disparity between the Bryant
101. 43 C.F.R. § 2561.1(d) (2001).
102. Degnan, 16 Ind.L.Rptr. at 3038 (“[T]he court declares that plaintiffs acquired equitable title to their allotments when the Secretary granted interim approval of their respective allotment applications in 1975.”).
Another gauge for when the status changes to Indian trust land is when the
BIA assumes authority over the land. Once the allotment is administratively approved by the BLM, or is found to qualify for legislative approval, the BIA assumes full authority over the allotment with respect to the granting of less than fee
interests in the land (such as right-of-way interests) and protecting the land
against trespass. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 21, at 125-30. This change of
authority over the land is memorialized in a Memorandum of Understanding between the BLM and the BIA. BLM Agreement No. AK-950-AG9-323 (1979).
103. Alaska v. Babbitt (Bryant), 182 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 1999).
104. Id. at 674-76.
105. Id. (citing to Alaska v. Babbitt (Albert), 38 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir.
1994)).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 677.
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decision and the Albert and Foster decisions on this issue also
opens the court to criticism that cases are decided on the basis of
the desired outcome, rather than on the basis of a reasoned application of precedent and law.
The filing of an allotment application protects Indian occupancy of the land, including subsequent disposals or appropriations
108
Contrary to the decision in Albert,
by the federal government.
however, mere application does not change the land into Indian
109
trust land. The status of the land is not changed until there is an
administrative decision approving the allotment (or determining
110
that it qualifies for legislative approval). Under its precedent, the
Ninth Circuit may not give effect to the agency decision for the
purpose of concluding that the land is Indian land and then refuse
judicial review of this same agency decision, as it did in Albert and
111
Foster.
C. The Waiver of Sovereign Immunity by 43 U.S.C. § 1632(a)
The Foster court summarily dismissed Alaska’s argument that
112
43 U.S.C. § 1632(a) waived sovereign immunity. Without stating
or commenting on the language of the statute, the court concluded
that it is only a statute of limitations and cannot be interpreted to
108. 43 C.F.R. § 2561.1(e) (2001); see also Jonas Ningeok, 109 IBLA 347, 351
(1989).
109. See Jonas Ningeok, 109 IBLA at 351 (explaining that, without application,
open and notorious use and occupancy of the land will protect the Native’s rights
to the land, except for disposals or appropriations by the federal government, but
that where no application is filed, use and occupancy of land claimed for an allotment gives no rights as against the United States); see also State of Alaska (Johnson & Craig), 133 IBLA 281, 290 n.11 (1995) (stating that Congress has “plenary
authority to dispose of public land” regardless of whether a Native qualifies under
the Native Allotment Act); United States v. Flynn, 53 IBLA 208, 234 (1981). Until Foster filed her application for a Native allotment, the federal government was
free to appropriate the land to other uses, which it did. Foster did not file her application until 1971—long after Alaska received its right-of-way in 1969 for the
Parks highway and long after Alaska received its material site in 1961. State of
Alaska (Foster), 125 IBLA 291, 292-93 (1993). Under Secretarial Policy of June 6,
1973, an allotment may not be granted on lands that are appropriated at the time
of filing the allotment application. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, BLM
ALASKA HANDBOOK 1991, NATIVE ALLOTMENT APP. 2, at 2 (1991).
110. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
111. Wehrli v. County of Orange, 175 F.3d 692, 694-95 (9th Cir. 1999). Although decided after Albert and Foster, Wehrli follows the principles announced
by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1966 in United States v. Utah Construction & Mining
Co., 384 U.S. 394, 421-23 (1966). See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
112. Alaska v. Babbitt (Foster), 75 F.3d 449, 451 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995).
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be an “unequivocally expressed” waiver of sovereign immunity.113
In view of the statute’s express language, the court’s brusque
treatment of this issue appears designed to reach a result the court
114
wanted. Section 1632(a) is undoubtedly a statute of limitations,
115
as is stated in the statute’s title. However, it also expressly provides, albeit in the negative, that agency decisions are subject to judicial review as long as the party seeking review first exhausts ad116
The statute cannot be reasonably
ministrative appeal rights.
interpreted otherwise. Further, a statute of limitations written in
terms applying to all parties is superfluous if judicial review is
barred by sovereign immunity for everyone other than the allot117
ment applicant. In fact, the statute is written to apply to all parties, both in terms of being a statute of limitations and in terms of
allowing judicial review. The Ninth Circuit has effectively nullified
this statute with respect to Alaska and other third parties.
There is nothing in the legislative history of 43 U.S.C. §
1632(a) that suggests a different interpretation than a plain reading
118
of the statutory language. The language of the legislative history
and the statute itself suggest an underlying assumption that judicial
review is available to all parties. In view of the express waiver of
sovereign immunity in the APA for judicial review of administra119
tive decisions, and the QTA’s silence on the waiver of sovereign
120
immunity for judicial review of agency decisions, it undoubtedly
did not occur to the drafters of 43 U.S.C. § 1632 that anything more
121
Given that
need be stated about waiving sovereign immunity.
Congress imposed a statute of limitations for judicial review of
agency decisions, and that there is no intimation in the legislative

113. Id.
114. In relevant part 43 U.S.C. § 1632(a) (2000) provides:
[A] decision of the Secretary . . . shall not be subject to judicial review
unless such action is initiated before a court of competent jurisdiction
within two years after the day the Secretary’s decision becomes final or
December 2, 1980, whichever is later: Provided, That the party seeking
such review shall first exhaust any administrative appeal rights.
115. 43 U.S.C. § 1632 is entitled “Statute of limitations on decisions of Secretary and reconveyance of land by Village Corporation.”
116. 43 U.S.C. § 1632(a).
117. Id.
118. S. REP. NO. 96-413, at 292 (1980).
119. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000).
120. See 28 U.S.C. § 2409(a) (2000).
121. Further, prior to enactment of 43 U.S.C. § 1632(a) in 1980, the Ninth Circuit had held that judicial review was available on administrative decisions approving allotment applications. Pence v. Kleppe, 529 F.2d 135, 138 (9th Cir. 1976).
The drafters of this legislation would naturally assume this would remain the law.
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history that sovereign immunity is not waived, the court’s interpretation in Albert strains credulity. The Ninth Circuit’s illogic is possible only because it misinterprets the QTA.
D. Jurisdiction to Adjudicate a Constitutional Claim
The federal government’s initial approval of Foster’s allotment
claim was also a violation of the Property Clause of the U.S. Con122
stitution. The Property Clause gives the Secretary of the Interior
the authority to dispose of public lands to the extent authorized by
123
Congress. By statute, the Secretary is authorized to approve al124
lotments only on “unappropriated” land. Alaska’s 1961 material
125
site on Foster’s allotment claim is defined as “appropriated” land.
Therefore, the Secretary’s decision approving an allotment of land
to Foster is a violation of both the Allotment Act and the Property
Clause.
Foster held that sovereign immunity barred consideration of
126
The court reasoned that suits
Alaska’s constitutional claim.
against the federal government “alleging actions [by a government
official] that are . . . unconstitutional” are officer’s suits, and there127
fore subject to the sovereign immunity of the federal government.
The court reached this conclusion by equating officer’s suits with
ultra vires suits (actions against government officials based on
128
statutory or constitutional violations). The court then concluded

122. U.S. CONST. ART. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
123. The Supreme Court interprets the Property Clause as granting exclusive
authority to Congress to dispose of public lands. Utah Power & Light Co. v.
United States, 243 U.S. 389, 404 (1917). The Property Clause prohibits both the
courts and the executive agencies of government from disposing of public lands
contrary to an Act of Congress. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 27
(1947).
124. 43 U.S.C. § 270-1 (Supp. V 1965-1969) (repealed 1971); State of Alaska
(Johnson & Craig), 133 IBLA 281, 289 (1995) (“[T]he [BLM’s] authority to allot
Federal lands to Alaskan Natives under the Act of May 17, 1906, is limited to ‘vacant, unappropriated, and unreserved nonmineral land.’”); see Alaska v. Babbitt
(Bryant), 182 F.3d 672, 676-77 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussing the Alaska Native Allotment Act and the Highway Act); see also Alaska v. Norton, 168 F. Supp. 2d
1102, 1106-09 (D. Alaska 2001).
125. 23 U.S.C. § 317(b) (2000) (stating that if a proposed appropriation of land
for use as a highway right-of-way is not “contrary to the public interest or inconsistent with the purposes for which such land . . . [is] reserved,” then such lands
may be appropriated). See Bryant, 182 F.3d at 677.
126. Alaska v. Babbitt (Foster), 75 F.3d 449, 452-53 (9th Cir. 1995).
127. Id.
128. Id.
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that because Block v. North Dakota129 held that the artifice of officer’s suits against the federal government was proscribed by the
QTA, this necessarily barred Alaska’s claim that the Secretary
130
acted ultra vires by his violation of the Constitution.
In making this ruling the Foster court ignored earlier Ninth
Circuit decisions holding that the court had jurisdiction to entertain
an action for judicial review of an agency decision based on the
131
agency’s ultra vires and unconstitutional action. The court’s
statement in Foster that it is bound to affirm the dismissal of
132
Alaska’s suit on the basis of Albert is more than moderately disingenuous. If Foster had truly followed Albert on its ultra vires
holding, and not just the part of Albert concerning the QTA, the
Foster court would have had to reverse the district court’s decision
133
dismissing Alaska’s action for judicial review.

129. 461 U.S. 273 (1983).
130. Foster, 75 F.3d at 453 (citing Block, 461 U.S. at 286).
131. Alaska v. Babbitt (Albert), 38 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Yakima Tribal Court, 806 F.2d 853, 859-60 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Any claim”
asserting constitutional violations by a government officer is a “per se divestiture
of sovereign immunity.”); Donnelly v. United States, 850 F.2d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir.
1988) (holding that there is jurisdiction apart from the QTA to review an agency
decision where ultra vires conduct by the government is alleged, and that Block is
inapplicable because “no independent administrative wrongdoing [i.e. no ultra vires action] was alleged in Block,” while such wrongdoing is at the heart of the
Donnellys’ claims).
132. Foster, 75 F.3d at 454.
133. The result-oriented nature of the Foster opinion is also evident from the
Ninth Circuit’s earlier version of its opinion, reported as Alaska v. Babbitt (Foster), 67 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 1995). The earlier Foster decision held, on the basis of
Albert, that an action based on the ultra vires conduct of the government agency
was not subject to a bar of sovereign immunity. Id. at 867. Nevertheless, the earlier Foster decision affirmed that Alaska’s ultra vires action had been appropriately dismissed by the district court because the IBLA had properly applied the
relation back doctrine to defeat Alaska’s highway grant. Id. at 868. The court observed that “Foster’s preference right was deemed to relate back to 1964. As of
that date, the disputed land was, in fact, ‘unappropriated,’ and 23 U.S.C. § 317(b)
therefore does not preclude a 43 U.S.C. § 270-1 allotment.” Id.
Had the court been correct with the facts, its rationale and conclusion in the
earlier Foster opinion would arguably have been sound. However, the court had
overlooked the 1961 material site. This oversight was critical because it meant
that the land had already been appropriated by 1964, and therefore was not available for an allotment under the Allotment Act or the Property Clause. In a petition for rehearing, Alaska pointed out the court’s mistake which, when corrected,
should have required reversal under the court’s ultra vires holding. The Ninth
Circuit’s response was to deny the petition for rehearing, and issue the new Foster
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The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed in Bryant that it meant what it
said in Foster: “The ultra vires argument has to be rejected in this
case because it would be no more than the old officers’ suit in new
134
words.” Interestingly, Bryant fails to explain that Alaska’s ultra
vires argument is a claim that the BLM violated the Property
Clause of the Constitution by allotting public land in violation of an
act of Congress. The court labeled Alaska’s claim as merely an ultra vires claim, and did not disclose the allegation of a constitu135
tional violation.
The interpretation of Block by the Ninth Circuit is unique. No
other court has held that federal jurisdiction is lacking to adjudi136
cate a claim that federal officials violated the U.S. Constitution.
137
Foster’s holding is also at odds with Supreme Court precedent. If
the court in Foster were correct in its interpretation, one would expect the Supreme Court in Block to have stated something directly
in regard to the government’s immunity from suit on claims based
138
on unconstitutional action by a government official. The Court,
however, did not intimate that its intention was to make such a
139
Nothing in Foster indicates an awareness on the Ninth
ruling.
Circuit’s part of the “serious constitutional question” its interpreta140
Instead, Foster simply rejected Alaska’s
tion of Block creates.
constitutional argument without even commenting on the contrary

opinion, disavowing its ultra vires holdings in Albert and its previous opinion in
Foster and ignoring Alaska’s constitutional claim. 75 F.3d at 449.
134. Alaska v. Babbitt (Bryant), 182 F.3d 672, 674-75 (9th Cir. 1999).
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Florida v. United States Dep’t of Interior, 768 F.2d 1248, 1251-52
(11th Cir. 1985) (holding that there is no sovereign immunity where action of government official is challenged as unconstitutional); Kozera v. Spirito, 723 F.2d
1003, 1008 (1st Cir. 1983).
137. See Davis v. Passman, 441 U.S. 228, 242 (1979) (holding that constitutional
rights are to be enforced through the courts unless it is “textually demonstrable”
that it is committed to a coordinate political department).
138. See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 373 (1974) (holding that where
Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to
do so must be clear, and supported by “clear and convincing” evidence). Such intent is not to be found in the QTA.
139. See also Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (ruling, post-Block, that
a “serious constitutional question . . . would arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim”) (internal
quotations omitted).
140. Alaska v. Babbitt (Foster), 75 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that
Alaska may not use the ultra vires exception to sovereign immunity to divest the
United States of immunity).
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U.S. Supreme Court precedent.141 For our constitutional system to
work, the court must have jurisdiction to consider claims of constitutional violations by the government as a check on the executive
branch’s misuse of power.
E. Sovereign Immunity as a Sword to Defeat Property Rights
Albert and Foster did not affect the Ninth Circuit decision in
142
Pence v. Kleppe, which allows judicial review to allotment appli143
cants. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the QTA
leaves Native allotment applicants with the right to have judicial
review of administrative adjudications affecting their allotment
claims. However, Alaska and other third parties who may have
their long-standing property interests extinguished in these administrative adjudications are barred from having such agency deci144
sions judicially reviewed. The Ninth Circuit makes no attempt to
justify this disparity of treatment. There is nothing in any relevant
statute, or the legislative history of any relevant statute, that indicates that Congress intended such an outcome.
The allotment claimant therefore can nullify third-party interests in an agency proceeding, and if the allotment claimant is successful at the agency level, he or she can bar judicial review of the
agency decision. If unsuccessful, the allotment claimant can proceed to have the agency decision reviewed in federal court, thus
145
having another opportunity to defeat third-party interests. This
situation is inherently unfair. Further, it is the federal government
that initiates the agency process to adjudicate the allotment claim
146
and validity of third-party interests in the land. In regard to In-

141. Id.
142. 529 F.2d 135 (9th Cir. 1976).
143. Other federal cases from Alaska have also entertained actions brought by
allotment applicants for judicial review of IBLA decisions denying Native allotment applications. See, e.g., Akootchook v. United States, 271 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.
2001); Silas v. Babbitt, 96 F.3d 355 (9th Cir. 1996); Shields v. United States, 698
F.2d 987 (9th Cir. 1983); Olympic v. United States, 615 F. Supp. 990 (D. Alaska
1985).
144. Most IBLA decisions concerning Native allotments where Alaska is a
party illustrate that agency adjudication involves the adjudication of interests that
conflict with the allotment claim. See, e.g., Sinyon & Mohamad, 124 IBLA 386
(1992). Such interests can be trade and manufacturing sites (43 C.F.R. subpt.
2562), homesites (43 CF.R. subpt. 2563), airport land (43 C.F.R. subpt. 2640), appropriations (23 U.S.C. § 317), state selections (Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No.
85-508 § 6(b), 72 Alaska Stat. 339 (1958)), and interests under many other laws.
145. See generally Silas, 96 F.3d 355.
146. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 21, at 125-30.
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dian lands, the purpose of sovereign immunity is to protect such
land from encroachment. Its purpose is not as an offensive weapon
to be used to defeat vested property rights of third parties that, in
the case of Alaska, were granted by the sovereign in the first place.
Where Indian trust land is created by an agency decision that
nullifies third-party interests in the land, a bar to judicial review is
147
inappropriate. Not only may there be valid existing rights in the
land prior to Indian occupancy and application for an allotment,
but the land may also have been appropriated by the federal government prior to application for an allotment, thus precluding the
148
allotment as a matter of law. The Ninth Circuit’s label of the land
as Indian trust land under the QTA allows an agency to divest third
parties and Alaska of their long-standing interests, with no possible
149
judicial review of the divestiture. There is no compensation provided for the land interests that are taken and lost, there is no judicial check on the disposal of public land by an agency, and there is
no judicial oversight on the fairness of the administrative process.

147. Alaska frequently has multiple interests, some of which may overlap, in
land claimed for an allotment. The BLM may adjudicate these interests in separate decisions in the same proceeding, as it did in the Foster adjudication in which
there are four BLM decisions. Alaska’s different interests include several overlapping material sites, as well as the 1962 and 1969 highway right-of-way grants
that overlap the 1961 material site. A court must take care before it reaches a
conclusion that an agency decision created Indian trust land. If an agency decision
leaves a competing interest to the allotment unadjudicated, then the land may not
be Indian trust land. This is especially true if the competing interest is an appropriation, which renders the land unavailable for allotment, as in Foster. Therefore, while the 1979 BLM decision in the Foster adjudication approved her allotment claim, the land cannot be Indian land because the 1979 decision left
unadjudicated Alaska’s material sites which covered the land. See supra notes
124, 125, infra note 158 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 124, 125 and accompanying text.
149. The United States waives its immunity when it initiates an action against a
property interest. United States v. Martin, 267 F.2d 764, 769 (10th Cir. 1959). In
Albert, the court rejected Alaska’s argument that the United States waived immunity by attacking Alaska’s interests in the disputed lands at the agency level.
Alaska v. Babbitt (Albert), 38 F.3d 1068, 1075 (9th Cir. 1994). The court held that
this argument was “misguided” because it was Alaska that appealed from the adverse administrative ruling. Id. The court’s reasoning is disingenuous. The federal government initiated the administrative proceeding to invalidate Alaska’s
right-of-way interest. While Alaska does indeed file the complaint for judicial review, that is but an intermediate “appellate” review process, which directly flows
from the proceeding started by the federal government to divest Alaska of a valid
existing right.
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The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the QTA also creates a
conflict with 43 U.S.C. § 1634(a)(1), which requires that legislatively approved Native allotment applications be made “subject to
150
valid existing rights.” State highway rights-of-way granted by the
151
BLM are recognized as valid existing rights. If judicial review of
IBLA decisions which fail to make allotments subject to valid existing rights is denied under the QTA, then the Ninth Circuit has
152
effectively given the IBLA veto power over an act of Congress
with respect to legislatively approved allotments. No statute or
legislative history exists that suggests Congress intended this result.
F. The “Colorable Claim” Test for Application of the QTA
While the Ninth Circuit is adamant that the QTA generally
does not waive sovereign immunity for purposes of judicial review
of IBLA decisions concerning Native allotment claims, it has always recognized one exception. The QTA does waive sovereign
153
immunity where the claim of Indian trust lands is not “colorable.”
In Bryant, the court held that the federal district court had jurisdiction to consider the merits of Alaska’s action for judicial review of
the IBLA decision because a “new administrative position eviscer154
ates the basis for the earlier IBLA decision.” Bryant held that this
new administrative position “necessarily means that the claim that
the land at issue is Indian land is not ‘colorable,’ so the exception
to the Indian lands exception demarcated in Foster, Albert, and
[155]
156
Wildman applies, and there is jurisdiction under the [QTA].”
150. Albert, 38 F.3d at 1075 (where the subject allotment had been legislatively
approved). This contrasts with Foster, where the allotment was administratively
approved by a 1979 BLM decision. Alaska v. Babbitt (Foster), 75 F.3d 449, 451-52
(9th Cir. 1995). While this distinction means that 43 U.S.C. § 1634 is not applicable to Foster, such administratively approved allotments must nevertheless be
made subject to valid existing rights. Alaska v. Norton, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 1102,
1106 (D. Alaska 2001); see also CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 21, at 119 (discussing
the distinction between administratively and legislatively approved allotments).
151. Norton, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 1106; see also State of Alaska (Goodlataw), 140
IBLA 205, 213 (1997); State of Alaska (Johnson & Craig), 133 IBLA 281, 290
(1995) (“[The state’s] right-of-way is a ‘valid existing right’ . . . under section
905(a)(1) of ANILCA.”); see also Myers v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 695, 700
(D. Alaska 1962) (“Where a public road has been created over a part of the public
domain, one who thereafter acquires title to, or rights in, that part of the public
domain takes and holds subject to the right-of-way for such road.”), aff’d 323 F.2d
580 (9th Cir. 1963).
152. 43 U.S.C. § 1634(a)(1) (2000).
153. Alaska v. Babbitt (Bryant), 182 F.3d 672, 674-75 (9th Cir. 1999).
154. Id. at 676.
155. Wildman v. United States, 827 F.2d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir. 1987).
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Although Bryant perhaps signals a new willingness of the
Ninth Circuit to consider judicial review of IBLA decisions involving Native allotments, the court’s continued reliance on the
QTA hardly gives Alaska solace. The court approved the language
of Albert that “the Indian lands sovereign immunity applies
157
whether the government is right or wrong.” Bryant also agreed
with Albert that “judicial inquiry extends no further than ‘a determination that the government had some rationale,’ and that its position ‘was not undertaken in either an arbitrary or frivolous man158
ner.’” The conclusion one must draw from Bryant is that judicial
review will be allowed only if the decision of the IBLA is dramatically inconsistent with IBLA precedent. There will be no judicial
review based on constitutional claims, statutory claims, or factual
claims, as long as the government can identify some rationale, even
an incorrect one, for the agency decision. Without a bright line
definition of “colorable claim,” the federal government will be
compelled by its trust duty to protect Native allotments to seek

156. Bryant, 182 F.3d at 676.
157. Id. at 675.
158. Id. (quoting Alaska v. Babbitt (Albert), 38 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir.
1994)). The looseness of such a standard is evident in Foster. The court held that
the administrative determination approving the allotment was not “arbitrary or
frivolous,” and therefore was “colorable” on the basis of the 1979 approval by the
BLM of Foster’s application, notwithstanding the 1961 material site. Alaska v.
Babbitt (Foster), 75 F.3d 449, 452 (9th Cir. 1995). Foster states that Alaska could
have raised the issue of the 1961 material site grant in 1979 or during the subsequent administrative process. Id. This rationale is superficial. The BLM decision
recognizing and making Foster’s allotment subject to the 1961 material site grant
means that she cannot have a “colorable” claim that the property is Indian land.
The 1961 grant appropriated the land and made it unavailable for an allotment.
Moreover, the 1979 BLM decision did not take action against any grant issued to Alaska by the BLM—neither the 1961 material site grant nor the 1969
Parks Highway right-of-way grant. No administrative action was ever taken
against a grant until a much later BLM decision with respect to the highway grant,
which Alaska appealed. State of Alaska (Foster), 125 IBLA 291, 291 (1993).
Alaska had no reason to believe the 1979 approval had any effect on its highway
grant. Under 43 C.F.R. section 2234.1-5(a) (1965), right-of-way grants could be
cancelled or terminated only by a specific order of cancellation. S. Idaho Conf.
Ass’n of Seventh Day Adventists v. United States, 418 F.2d 411, 414-15, 415 n.7
(9th Cir. 1969); State of Alaska, (Johnson & Craig), 133 IBLA 281, 287 & n.8
(1995). Since the BLM never took action against the 1961 material site grant, the
land covered by this grant could never be, as a matter of law, Indian trust land.
See supra notes 124, 125 and accompanying text.
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dismissal on the basis of the Indian lands exception of the QTA of
virtually any claim filed by Alaska, no matter how meritorious.159
IV. CONCLUSION
Wedded to precedent, the Ninth Circuit has resisted correcting
160
the interpretation of the QTA it made in Albert. Perhaps the Albert court felt a particular outcome was warranted based on its perception of social justice. Whatever the reason for the misinterpretation, the jurisdictional vacuum must be filled. The parties are
entitled to have their conflict over ownership of the land settled. It
is a conflict that arises from application of federal law, and it is apparent that it will need to be settled by new federal law. One solu161
tion would be an amendment to 43 U.S.C. § 1632(a) providing
that “sovereign immunity is waived where any adversely affected
party seeks judicial review, notwithstanding any law to the contrary.” Further, Alaska should be given one year to initiate an action for judicial review of any IBLA decision made since 1980,
159. Alaska v. Babbitt (Odinzoff), F94-0016-CV (D. Alaska 1994), is a good
example. This case was generated by the federal government’s refusal to correct
the land description in an Allotment Certificate caused by a BLM surveyor’s mistake. The allotment approved by the BLM did not conflict with an Alaska interest. However, because of the BLM surveyor’s mistake, the property description in
the Allotment Certificate contained an error that caused the allotment to encroach on a local airport owned by Alaska. What should have been a simple clerical correction of a conceded mistake by the surveyor turned into costly litigation.
The federal government insisted on defending on the basis of sovereign immunity,
using the QTA and other arguments.
160. There has been criticism within the Ninth Circuit concerning the court’s
reluctance to acknowledge its mistakes and correct its decisions. For example, in a
concurring opinion, Judge O’Scannlain wrote:
I believe we do ourselves little credit, and the lawyers and litigants who
practice before us little good, when we ignore an irreconcilable conflict
in our decisions . . . . The law of this circuit, in short, is far more likely to
develop in a rational fashion when we acknowledge our mistakes and
move quickly to correct them than when we contrive to disavow them.
Koff v. United States, 3 F.3d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1993) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring); see also United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting from the order rejecting suggestion for rehearing en banc). In
his dissent in Weitzenhoff, Judge Kleinfeld acknowledged the practice of the Ninth
Circuit of generally not reviewing panel decisions of the court en banc, even when
it feels them to be mistaken. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1293. Rather, he observed
that en banc review is “generally reserved for conflicting precedent within the circuit . . . and only where there are egregious errors in important cases.” Id. It is
submitted that the Ninth Circuit should relax its criteria for en banc review of
cases so that more mistaken panel decisions, such as Foster, may be corrected.
161. 43 U.S.C. § 1632(a) (2000).
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when § 1632 was enacted, provided the IBLA decision was not
previously judicially reviewed on the merits.
Additional amending legislation should also be considered to
end the litigation over conflicts between Native allotment claims
and right-of-way grants made to Alaska pursuant to 23 U.S.C. §
317. Most of these grants were appropriated in the 1960s and the
highways have long since been built. All Native allotment applica162
tions must have been filed by 1971, yet there has been constant
litigation as a result of the retroactive application of the 1987 and
163
1989 GVEA decisions. The IBLA now recognizes that, as a result
of more recent decisions, the “continuing validity [of the GVEA
164
decisions] has been undermined.” Moreover, the plenary power
of the United States over public land allowed the BLM to make
highway grants to Alaska, regardless of Indian occupancy where
165
there was no allotment application. It is long past time to put an
end to the legal wrangling between Alaska, the allotment applicant,
and the federal government. This can be done by legislation clarifying that the “subject to valid existing rights” clause of 43 U.S.C. §
1634(a)(1) includes right-of-way grants issued pursuant to 23
U.S.C. § 317 prior to the date of the allotment application. This
does nothing more than make clear what was undoubtedly the intent of § 1634(a)(1) in the first place.
Though the Ninth Circuit may have erred again in Foster,
Congress can still correct the court’s mistake. Even the judiciary
must be checked and balanced on occasion by another branch of
government. Where an agency approves an allotment on public
land, and in the process nullifies long-standing prior rights of others
in that land, it is not only fair but necessary that judicial review of
the agency decision be allowed. The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation
of the Quiet Title Act to bar judicial review is strained and unfortunate. With respect to Foster, the result of the court’s interpretation is only to preserve the status quo: Alaska is left in possession
and control of the Parks Highway right-of-way, and Foster is left
with merely her assertion that the land should be hers. The controversy between the parties is left unresolved despite many years
of litigation. In short, no one benefits from the jurisdictional vacuum created by the Ninth Circuit.

162. Id. § 1617(a). In 1995, however, a narrow exception was created for
Alaska Native Veterans. See id. § 1629(g).
163. See supra notes 14, 20 and accompanying text.
164. State of Alaska (Goodlataw), 140 IBLA 205, 213 n.6 (1997).
165. See supra notes 34, 109 and accompanying text.

